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NOTES AND COMMENT
Editor-PHILIP ADELMAN
THE INTERBOROUGH RECEIVERSHIP.
On August 25, 1932, the Interborough Rapid Transit Company
consented to an equity receivership in an action brought against it
by the American Brake Shoe Company in the Southern District
Court. Attached to the papers consenting to such receivership was
an affidavit in proper form by James L. Quackenbush, attorney for
the company, stating that in his judgment it would be undesirable
to have a trust company appointed receiver in the cause and giving
his reasons. -The day previous, Judge Martin T. Manton, Senior
Circuit Judge, signed an order designating himself a district judge.'
Under the standing order 2 for distribution of business in the Dis-
trict Court the petition for the receivership would in the regular
course of business have been presented to Judge Robert B. Patterson
who was then sitting and available. Judge Manton thereupon an-
nounced his disagreement with the distribution of business by the
senior district judge and invoking Section 23 of the Judicial Code 3
appealed to himself as senior circuit judge to settle the theoretical
dispute between the district judges. He, therefore, ordered that
applications for the appointment of receivers might be made to him
as well as to the district judge regularly assigned for that purpose
by the senior district judge.4
Thereafter judge Manton appointed receivers for the company
and appointed attorneys for the receivers. The order was subse-
quently extended to include a subsidiary, the Manhattan Railway
Company. A motion was then made returnable before judge Wool-
sey, a district judge, by one Johnson, a stockholder of the Manhat-
tan Railway Company, for an order vacating the appointment of
the receivers and their attorneys as irregular and praying for the
appointment of new receivers. The petitioners contended that pur-
suant to Rule 1la of the Rules of the Southern District Court of New
'28 U. S. C. A. §22: "The Chief Justice of the United States, or the cir-
cuit justice of any judicial district, or the senior circuit judge thereof, may,
if the public interest requires, designate and assign any circuit judge of ajudicial circuit to hold a district court within such circuit. * * *"
2 Rule la of the United States District Court, Southern District of New
York, General Rules, effective July 1, 1932, provides: "Any judge designated to
sit in the District Court for the Southern District of New York shall do such
work only as may be assigned to him by the senior district judge."
'28 U. S. C. A. 27: "In districts having more than one district judge, thejudges may agree on the division of business and assignment of cases for trial
in said district; but in case they do not so agree, the senior circuit judge of the
circuit in which the district lies, shall make all necessary orders for the division
of business and the assignment of cases for trial in said district."
"Supra note 2.
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York,5 Judge Patterson was the only judge who had authority to
appoint receivers in equity causes.
On his own initiative, Judge Woolsey consolidated 6 the Ameri-
can Brake Shoe Company cause and the Johnson cause and set aside
as void and of no juridical effect all orders signed by Judge Manton
as a district judge.7 The request for the appointment of new re-
ceivers was denied and the operation of the order vacating the
orders of Judge Manton was stayed for twenty days so as to allow
time for an appeal to the Circuit Court. An appeal was taken to
the Circuit Court which reversed the order of Judge Woolsey and
upheld the orders of Judge Manton.8 Certiorari was subsequently
granted by the United States Supreme Court.
Judge Manton's orders were attacked specifically on three
grounds. The only authority under which a circuit judge can be
appointed a district judge is to be found in Section 22, Vol. 28 of
the United States Code.9 It was strongly urged by those seeking
to vacate Judge Manton's appointments that it was the intention
of Congress that this section should only be invoked where the pub-
lic interest required, as where there had been an alarming accumu-
lation of business before the Circuit Court or where a particular
district judge was disqualified from hearing a particular cause be-
cause of his having participated in it as counsel, that no such emer-
gency existed in the present case, and hence there was no basis
for the invoking of the statute.
Assuming further that Judge Manton's designating himself a
district judge was valid, petitioners contended that he still had no
authority to designate himself to hear the application for the re-
ceivership for to do so would violate Rule la of the General Rules
of the United States District Court, Southern District.10 Those
desiring to upset the orders of the Senior Circuit Judge further
contended that under Section 22 of Vol. 28 of the United States
Code," Judge Manton did not become a district judge in the ordi-
nary meaning of the term; that said section merely provides for
Rule Ila of the General Rules of the Southern District of New York
provides: "All applications for the appointment of receivers in equity causes,
in bankruptcy causes and any other cause (except where a receiver in bank-
ruptcy may be appointed by a referee as provided in the bankruptcy rules) shall
be made to the judge assigned to hold the bankruptcy and motion part of the
business of the court and to no other judge."
128 U. S. C. A. 734: "When causes of a like nature or relative to the same
question are pending before a court of the United States, or of any Territory,
the court may make such orders and rules concerning proceedings therein as
may be conformable to the usages of courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or
delay in the administration of justice, and may consolidate said causes when it
appears reasonable to do so."
IJohnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co. et aL, 1 Fed. Supp. 809 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).8 Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co. et al., 61 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
'Supra note 1.
" Supra note 2.
nSupra note 1.
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the appointment of a circuit judge to do the work of a district
judge; that under such appointment the appointee does not become
a district judge and hence has no power or authority to claim a
disagreement of the division of business under Section 27, Vol. 28
of the United States Code.' 2
"Public Interest" is an extremely elastic term and difficult of
definition. The Court of Appeals of this state has held13 that the
courts have no authority to determine whether a "public interest"
existed within the meaning of Section 153 of the Judiciary Law14
which gives to the Chief Executive power to convene the Supreme
Court in extraordinary term. The executive is not bound to dis-
close the reasons for urgency and the judiciary has no authority
to require their disclosure. In speaking of the very statute here
under consideration, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit said:"
"The 'public interest' is involved in the dispatch of all the
business of the courts. These sections of the statute were
intended to have a liberal and elastic rather than a strict
and rigid construction to facilitate the business of the courts."
The purpose of this particular section of the Code was to
enable a circuit judge who prior to the abolition of the Circuit
Court had partially heard an equity case therein to continue to
conduct the cause to a final decree in the District Court.'6 What
one tribunal may decide to be in the public interest may be deemed
to be to the public detriment by another. The term allows for much
latitude and it is difficult to conceive of a case where an appellate
court would reverse an order of a court of original jurisdiction
the basis for which was conceived in the public interest.
The authority for Rules la17 and 1la i8 of the District Court
are to be found in Section 27 of Vol. 28 of the United States Code.19
Ordinarily every judge has the inherent power to try any case in
the same tribunal which any other judge of the same jurisdiction
may preside in, regardless of existing rules of practice. 20  The
violation of such rules is considered a mere irregularity.2' Disre-
'
2Supra note 3.
People v. Supreme Court, 220 N. Y. 487, 116 N. E. 384 (1917).
:' "The governor may, when, in his opinion the public interest so requires,
appoint one or more extraordinary special or trial terms of the supreme court."
's United States v. Gill, 292 Fed. 136 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923).
Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Railway Co., 221 Fed. 440(S. D. N. Y. 1915).
' Supra note 2.
"Supra note 5.9 Supra note 3.2 People v. Barbera, 78 Cal. App. 277, 248 Pac. 304 (1926).
"1 Payne v. Garth, 285 Fed. 301 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) ; People v. Extraordi-
nary Trial Term, 228 N. Y. 463, 127 N. E. 486 (1920).
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gard of the rules apportioning judicial duties by the very same
judges who had previously assented thereto does not in itself deny
or invalidate the judicial functions of any judge.22 Such rules are
merely directory,23 and a refusal to abide by them does not con-
stitute reversible error.
2 4
The validity of Rules la and 11a 25 is to be doubted. In order
to be binding they must be consistent with laws of the United States
and Rules of Practice prescribed by the United States Supreme
Court.2 0  Are these rules consistent with the authority vested 2
7
in the senior circuit judge to designate a circuit judge to hold a
district court? Do they give the power of nullification to the senior
district judge by reason of his authority to apportion the business
before the district court, or has the senior circuit judge not only
the power to designate a circuit judge a district judge, but also the
authority to designate the matters over which he shall have juris-
diction? The former interpretation is illogical, the latter reasonable.
The power of appointment is limited to cases where the public in-
terest requires it,28 and it is more logical to assume that the legis-
lature intended a-public interest in regard to particular and specific
causes rather than a public interest based on whim or fancy.
Assuming that a circuit judge appointed under the provisions of
Sec. 22 of Vol. 28 29 of the United States Code does not thereby
become a district judge,30 his acts are nevertheless valid. He surely
is a judge de facto 31 if not a de jure one. He acts and purports
to act as a judge of the District Court under color of the direction
and authority contained in the designation order, in a duly insti-
tuted suit, when a duly constituted court had jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter. The title of de facto public officers
and the validity of their acts cannot be questioned in proceedings
Foley v. Utterbach, 196 Iowa 956, 195 N. W. 721 (1923).
Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. B. & P. S. Co., 263 U. S. 629,
44 Sup. Ct. 220 (1924) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 69 Fed. 559 (C. C. A.
9th, 1895); In re opinion of the Justices, 124 Maine 453, 126 Atl. 354, 363
(1924).
", Southern Pacific Co. v. Johnson, ibid.
Supra notes 2 and 5.
28 U. S. C. A. 731: "The district courts may, from time to time, and in
any manner not inconsistent with any law of the United States, or with any
rule prescribed by the Supreme Court under section 730 of this title, make rules
and orders directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of pleadings,
the taking of rules, the entering and making up of judgments by default, and
other matters in vacation, and otherwise regulate their own practice as may be
necessary or convenient for the advancement of justice and the prevention of
delays in proceeding."
'
7Supra note 1.
= Ibid.
2Ibid.
Craig v. Hecht, 263 U. S. 255, 44 Sup. Ct. 103 (1923) : "He was not a
District Judge, but a Circuit Judge assigned to hold a session of the District
Court."
I See State v. Carrol, 38 Conn. 449 (1871).
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to which they are not parties.32  The acts of a de facto judge can-
not be attacked collaterally, appeal being the remedy provided by
law.3 3
Judge Woolsey felt that Judge Manton was a "usurper" be-
cause of his violation of Rule la of the District Court Rules 84 and
that therefore he, a judge of equal juirisdiction, had power and
authority to nullify the acts of one who had purported to act as
a district judge. Based as it is entirely on the doubtful validity
of a court rule, it is impossible to agree with the learned Judge.
The conclusion that Judge Manton was at least a de facto district
judge is an inevitable one.
The conclusion is inescapable that Judge Manton's acts are
legally unimpeachable. Although no one will contend that Con-
gress contemplated that the sections of the Judicial Code invoked
were to be used in an instance as presented by the Interborough
case, basis and authority for Judge Manton's acts are to be there
found.
The case presents a more practical question. There is no
doubt that the direct purpose of the proceedings by Judge Manton
was to obviate the possibility of a trust company being appointed
receiver by the District Court.35 This personal desire by the Senior
Circuit Judge does not merit unnecessary interference with the busi-
ness of the District Court. If judges who constitute a court are
to function at their best, they must be masters in their own house.
Their rules of practice and procedure should not be subject to the
whim and caprice of others. Judge Manton's designation 'of him-
self instead of another circuit judge to hold the District Court,
and then appealing to himself as a senior circuit judge to adjust
a dispute he himself had created as a 'district judge, is not to be
commended.3 6
PHILIP ADELMAN.
'MECHEM,, PUBLIC OFFICERS (1890) §330.
' Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121 (1886); In re
Manning, 139 U. S. 504, 11 Sup. Ct. 624 (1891); Ball v. United States, 140
U. S. 118,11 Sup. Ct. 761 (1891) ; McDowell v. United States, 159 U. S. 596,
16 Sup. Ct. 111 (1895) ; Ex parte Henry Ward, 173 U. S. 452, 19 Sup. Ct. 459
(1899); Luhrig Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal and Dock Co., 287 Fed. 711
(C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
' Supra note 2.
See Instructions to Receivers, American Brake Shoe and Foundry Co. v.
Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 1 Fed. Supp. 820 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
S 28 U. S. C. A. 216: "*** * No judge before whom a cause or question
may have been tried or heard in a district court, or existing circuit court, shall
sit on the trial or hearing of such cause or question in the circuit court of
appeals."
